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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The decision in Parker is not beyond criticism. In New York,
the Surrogate's Court Procedure Act (SCPA) confers jurisdiction over
the recipient of a bequest from an estate 21 and was intended to fill
in specific gaps left by CPLR 302.22 If, as the Fourth Department
has held, 302 is broad enough to encompass gifts, why was the SCPA
provision needed?23
In any event, before the requirement of commerciality can be
disposed of, further analysis is needed.
CPLR 302(a)(4): Jurisdiction predicated upon ownership of property
before cause of action accrued.
Under CPLR 302(a)(4), a nondomiciliary may be subjected to
personal jurisdiction in New York if he owns, uses or possesses any
real property in the state. Although the jurisdictional possibilities
under this subsection are potentially broad,24 there have been only
a few cases to base jurisdiction under it. 25 Nevertheless, it has been
held that at the time of service the defendant need not have any
interest in the realty; it is sufficient if jurisdiction is grounded in "the
relationship existing between the defendant and the realty . . . at
the time the cause of action accrues. ' 26
In Karrat v. Merhib,27 the plaintiff sued to recover brokerage
commissions due under a contract for the sale of property in New
York. In opposition, the defendants asserted that the cause of action
accrued subsequent to the disposition of the property and, therefore,
jurisdiction could not be predicated upon CPLR 302(a)(4). None-
theless, the court ruled that by their ownership and sale of the land,
the defendants had transacted business in the state.2 8
21 SuRR. CT. PROC. Aar § 210(2)(b) (McKinney 1967).
22 58A McKINNEY'S SURR. CT. PROC. Acr 210, commentary at 290 (1967).
23 The SCPA provision has been said to include gifts causa mortis if the disposition
of decedent's property came under the surrogate court's jurisdiction. Id., commentary
at 296. Thus, in Parker, this line of reasoning might have been followed to secure
jurisdiction over the donees for the Chautauqua County Surrogate's Court.
24 CPLR 302(a)(4) covers any interest in real property: fee, leasehold or easement.
1 WK&M 302.12. The only limitation appears to be that the cause of action must be
reasonably related to the property. 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 302, commentary at 433-34
(1963).
25 See Tebedo v. Nye, 45 Misc. 2d 222, 256 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County
1965); Hempstead Medical Arts Co. v. Mille, 150 N.Y.L.J. 111, Dec. 9, 1963, at 18, col. 6
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County).
26 Tebedo v. Nye, 45 Misc. 2d 222, 223, 256 N.Y.S.2d 235, 236 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga
County 1965).
27 62 Misc. 2d 72, 307 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1970).
28 But see Glassman v. Hyder, 23 N.Y.2d 354, 244 N.E.2d 259, 296 N.Y.S.2d 783
(1969).
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Without specifically deciding when the cause of action accrued, or
if indeed the cause of action must arise at the time of ownership, the
court also intimated that jurisdiction could be sustained under CPLR
302(a)(4). However, a prerequisite to jurisdiction under this subsection
would appear to be that defendant has some relationship to the land at
the time the cause of action accrues. 29 Thus, it is conceivable that other
courts will adopt a stricter approach, especially when it is established
that defendant has not transacted any business,30 or that a number of
years have passed between the disposition of the property and the ac-
crual of the cause of action.31
CPLR 303: Agent for service of process relationship exists only as long
as the action is pending.
The commencement of an action in New York by one who is not
subject to personal jurisdiction 32 is an automatic designation of his at-
torney in the action as his agent for service of process.33 Consequently, a
defendant who wishes to assert a cause of action in the nature of a coun-
terclaim against the nonresident plaintiff may do so by serving the
initiatory papers upon the attorney.3 4 However, this mode of service is
permissible only as long as the original action is pending, 5 i.e., from the
service of process to the entry of final judgment.36
In Banco Do Brasil v. Madison Steamship Corp.,37 the plaintiff
commenced an action to recover an amount allegedly received by de-
fendants in excess of the amount of judgment in a prior action, by
serving the attorneys who had represented the defendants. Since judg-
ment had already been entered in the original action, the court correctly
held that service upon the defendants' attorneys did not secure personal
jurisdiction over the defendants.
29 See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
30 See, e.g., Glassman v. Hyder, 23 N.Y.2d 354, 244 N.E.2d 259, 296 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1969).
31 See, e.g., Murphy v. Indovina, 384 Pa. 26, 119 A.2d 258 (1956).
32 The section is not limited to nonresidents. It applies to any plaintiff over whom
the defendant cannot acquire personal jurisdiction. 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 303, commentary
at 440 (1963).
33 CPLR 303.
34 It should be noted that substituted service on the attorney rather than personal
delivery is ineffective. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dupper, 33 App. Div. 2d
682, 305 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Ist Dep't 1969).
35 CPLR 303. Similar statutory schemes have been upheld as a proper exercise of
the state's jurisdiction. See, e.g., Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938).
36 See Concourse Super Serv. Station, Inc. v. Price, 33 Misc. 2d 503, 226 N.Y.S.2d
651 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1962). See also 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 303, commentary at
441 (1963).
37 61 Misc. 2d 1028, 307 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1970).
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